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of the spirit, which, as I believe, should animate all social work, or may have contributed to your own reflections some elements out of which better suggestions may spring.

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## THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ITS PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF ETHICS.

IN the larger and historical present, no more vital question is broached than that concerning the ultimate nature of ethical ideas; among English and American thinkers is such especially the case. Teutonic thought with all that is meritorious about it, has never in its history produced any such wealth of discussion as that which has grown out of the endeavor among English-speaking thinkers to adjust the respective claims of Hedonist and Intuitionist. But this dispute, which has so long been current, is to be continued with only meagre satisfaction. The student of modern ethics reads the fervent eloquence of a Martineau and the judicious logic of a Sidgwick half-wishing that such superior efforts might have been expended in some more worthy cause than that of combatting theory with theory, of adjusting claim to claim. Something more fundamental is to-day demanded. The *unum necessarium* of ethical science is some concept whose vitality has not been sapped by mere disputation. In a theory of value such a principle may perhaps be found.

Other sciences than that of ethics have already taken up the theory of value. In economics and theology, in popular thought and systematic speculation this may be observed. So far as economics is concerned, the pertinency of this theory is immediately apparent, as the practical application of the same is specific and technical. But no less vivid is the use made of the valuational idea in the Ritschlian theology. Here, it is systematically applied, filling the breach made by the extraction of speculation from theology. In addition to these particular

applications of the idea stand out the more general and speculative treatments of Nietzsche and Lotze. What a contrast between the lurid, epileptic utterances of the one and the calm, mysterious method of the other! "Transvaluation" (*Umwertung*) is Nietzsche's *bon mot*. To his vision are disclosed "new values," gleaming on an old world. Lotze looks upon the world as a "complex of all that has value." Thus it comes about that, in a general and speculative way, as well as in a more practical and definite manner, the idea of value has already received considerable attention. Now, ethics should be the science best calculated to appreciate such an idea. But, in its history, ethics has not been ready to develop a theory of value.

By a comparison of ancient and modern ethical systems, as well as after an examination of current ethical schools, the lack of the valuational principle may best be seen. Then, the limitations of these schools and systems may be noted and the importance of this principle more thoroughly appreciated. From quite alien standpoints, the antique and modern views of life unite in a common confession of want, where the principle of value is concerned, and such must be the conclusion when present-day tendencies are examined. When it has been shown that the valuational idea is the one thing needful in the adjustment of historical ethics, it will remain to determine the nature of such an idea as well as the proper method of expressing it in ethical thought. Ancient and modern views of life may be compared by regarding them respectively as æsthetic and dynamic. Where plastic form and artistic method prevailed in the one, the ideas of mechanism and organism dominate the other. These general differences are paralleled by characteristic methods of ethics. Ancient ethics was a doctrine of the good and of various virtues; modern ethics proceeds from principles of right and duty. In both cases, the principle of value is wanting.

That light which enabled the ancient to develop the ideas of virtue and the good likewise led him to regard the world as complete in itself. All that is real is given; all that is essential has been accomplished. So far as the needs and demands of life are involved, penetration and insight serve to reveal the

reality of the good, as well as to elaborate the different virtues. Believing in the imminence of ethical facts and relations, ancient thought never rose to the idea of obligation, never directly felt the need of struggling to accomplish the imperative. There is lacking the principle of performance as well as the feeling of obligation. The ethical spirit of Greece was that of complacency, deepening into resignation. Not so modern thought; here, it is man's duty to perform that which is right and this at once implies a struggle. That which is right must be wrought out. To obtain happiness is possible only by virtue of an effort on the part of the individual and the race. Ethical facts must be created and moral relations set up. Modern moralism is thus the counterpart of the plastic ethics of the ancient world. In the latter, ethical relations are looked upon as deducible by thought; in the former, all that is essentially right must be created.

With its idea of objective good and subjective virtue, the ancient method of ethics may be criticised as lacking in life and force. Nothing is accomplished nor need anything be wrought. All that is necessary is to assume the proper attitude whence the world may be beheld. Now the trouble consists in the fact that no end is set before the ethical subject, whereby value may be obtained. The good is only an intellectual product, just as virtue is a scholastic attitude. In modern thought, all is life and motion. The world is not yet finished; man is yet uneducated; society is still undeveloped. As in a process must all be regarded; nature is being evolved. Such a dynamic view of things results in regarding the world as a system of energies; man, as a complex of faculties. So far as practical thought is concerned, the essential aim in ethics would seem to consist in setting these faculties in motion. Perfect functioning is the ideal of modern life; in ethical science, this applies to both the individual and society. That which is wanting is the idea of a finished product. In ethical science, there is sought the right method of life; at the same time, the proper spring of action is investigated. Hereby, the modern ideals of conduct are influenced. Right becomes the proper method of attaining some undefined end. Ought is a senti-

ment calculated to initiate action, but it is only an initiative. Such results as are taken into account consist in the adjustment of the individual's own faculties within him, as also his relation to his fellows. Still, essential results are wanting, or fail to be taken into account. In this way, it might be said that, where ancient thought perceived no real ethical problem, modern thought is all problem and no solution.

Value, as an ethical principle, has been wanting in both ancient and modern systems. Before the special demand of this principle is felt in current ethical schools, the general lack of the concept must be taken into account. Good and right, as ethical ideals, are unable to make up this want. The valuational idea seems to make up this deficiency in formal ethical principles and thus enters as a competitor among the concepts which have been current in ancient and modern thought. If the Greek, even in the sublime instance of a Socrates, failed to rise to the idea of obligation, the modern shows no inclination to return to the ancient idea of the good. Where ethical writers refer to the *summum bonum*, their spirit is not that of constructive speculation but is only archæological. By making ethical relations inner and individual, modern thought has unnecessarily sacrificed the antique ideals of the abiding and universal character of the ethical. Thus, current ethical thought is guilty of a subjectivity which is by no means essentially modified by the social view of the ethical life. But, cannot the best of ancient and modern ethics as well be found in the concept of value? While it possesses the inness demanded by modern views of the soul, the valuational idea does not fail to contain somewhat of the spirit contained in the idea of the good. The principle of value, as a reconciler of ancient and modern morals, may not be wholly in vain.

A comparison of present ethical tendencies likewise exhibits a want which may be filled by the valuational idea. The breach between the principles of duty and happiness is in some way suggestive of that between the ancient and modern ideals of good and right. In the former case, the aptness of the value-theory will be more apparent. By a brief analysis of both Intuitionism and Hedonism, the service as well as the limita-

tion of each will become apparent; at the same time, the importance of value as a corrective may be observed.

Intuitionism is a term which may, perhaps, most readily identify, but which does not best describe, an ethical theory of an immediate intrinsic and imperative ethical principle. In outlining and defending this theory, two distinct methods are followed. As an intellectual doctrine, Intuitionism proceeds from the idea of conscience, as the source of the principle of right; from the volitional standpoint, this theory, in the form of a sense of ought, gives rise to the idea of duty. Butler and Kant respectively are typical of such tendencies. Thus stated, Intuitionism may be estimated accordingly. In marking out the distinctly ethical province, as well as in surveying all its problems *sub specie boni*, Intuitionism has the distinction of having made of ethics a distinct science, founded on its merits. As an independent study, not as an appendix to metaphysics nor as a part of political science, has this theory regarded its subject. "Common morality" has thus been justified. Intuitionism has attempted far more than this, but this service may be admitted and its scientific merit approved.

The source, the sanction and the practical significance which Intuitionism alleges deserve some examination. A "faculty-psychology," and all the ills which it is heir to, has not failed to find shelter in this school. For the sake of identifying a special, isolated moral function, the unity of conscience has been broken up. The sanction which is here offered, couched as it usually is in quasi logical forms, can hardly escape the difficulties of circular argument. To be sure, it may be possible for Intuitionism to construct judgments of right as independent forms of ethical thought; but the service of these is rather formal and there is still room for other similar forms as judgments of beauty, of utility and also of value. When the moral significance of Intuitionism assumes the form of a motto, "duty for duty's sake," the practical force of the theory would seem to be vitiated. It would seem as though, in itself, conduct could have no value, and the moral life no concern beyond normal ethical functioning. The merits of Intuitionism as a

theory of moral activity may still be seen when that activity is turned toward an end and conceived of as valuable.

By using the term Hedonism in a general way, two different forms of this theory may be expressed: utilitarianism and social evolution. Hobbes based the former upon politico-economical principles; in opposition to him, Hume regarded the proper standpoint as being social and historical. If the service of Intuitionism has been scientific, that of Hedonism was, in its beginning, historical. By virtue of the principles of Hedonism was the emancipation of modern life made possible. When Grotius deduced from reason his concept of *jus humanum*, he freed humanity from the yoke of mediæval tradition and authority. Modern man became a living soul. The effect of this deliverance was felt, not only in jurisprudence and ethics but also in art, as the "corporation pictures" of Rembrandt clearly attest. At the same time, Hedonism has been of more than historical service; it has ever shown that moral conduct is something desirable. In various ways has this been brought out; pleasure and utility, happiness and benevolence are principles which Hedonism has employed in approximating to this general idea of conduct's value. Unfortunately, such principles are insufficient for this purpose.

The proper criticism of Hedonism cannot be the same as in the case of Intuitionism, except that in a general way the valuational standpoint may be assumed. Questions of practical sufficiency and of moral merit are most appropriately to be brought up, where Hedonism is concerned. As a theory, is it sufficient unto the problems which life presents? Feeling is the sphere in which this theory lives and moves; here, no little difficulty is encountered. Not only has the Hedonist found value in the affectional process, but he has also assumed that such a form of value was realizable. Thus, an unguarded optimism is one of the chief dangers to which such a construction is exposed. Perhaps the original antipathy to the Hobbist pessimism has brought about this easy-going view, but the history of Hedonism manifests a heedless optimism. Pleasure has been regarded as certainly attainable; happiness as possible; benevolence, as a likely

tendency in human nature. But how differently does evolution interpret Hedonism! This method of explaining man and society genetically arose under pessimistic auspices. Not happiness, but life; not pleasure, but persistence in the world is the true end and aim. When the struggle for existence has made life possible, when some endurable social condition has been evolved, then the Hedonist may begin to consider the question of happiness and the possibility of altruism. Thus far, pleasure and happiness, instead of being ends in themselves, are by evolution viewed as symptoms of individual and social health. If evolution as a theory be correct, nature is plainly impatient with any such optimism as has characterized Hedonism.

The emancipation of the affectional process in consciousness, by virtue of which psychology passed from the ancient bipartite to the modern tripartite form, has never been seriously taken into account by Hedonism. Ever moving in the realm of feeling, this theory has failed to appreciate some of the most significant elements of the conscious process. It is the eighteenth century psychology which has been retained by Hedonism; the progress made in the last hundred years has not been seriously taken into account. By confining its attention to pleasure and pain alone and (except in the case of Mill) by looking upon distinctions which might be made in either half of this dualism as purely quantitative and not qualitative in their nature, Hedonism no more than any other theory may lay claim to the process of feeling, when the latter is viewed in its unity and completeness. Now, it is just here that the idea of value may be found. Overlooked in the historical development of ethics, this idea has not been discovered in the analysis of consciousness.

Historically viewed, value, as an ethical principle, would seem to occupy a position overlooked in ancient formalism and modern dynamism, as well as in the ethical schools of the present. The valuational principle may be regarded as the ground of conduct, just as, from a metaphysical standpoint, it may be one of the methods of studying reality. Value, as here employed, is not urged simply as a means of reconciling



opposed systems; that would be a bit pedantic; nevertheless, both Hedonism and intuitionism have this concept in common and thereby may their extreme conclusions be moderated. Although somewhat of an innovation, the value-principle has not failed to make its presence felt in history. In the ethical systems of Bentham and Kant are to be found characteristic and, accordingly, imperfect considerations of the valuational form of ethics.

Bentham antedates Kant in bringing out the idea of value; at the same time, his peculiar interpretation of this is, more than Kant's, an aberration from the essential notion of value. A devout and consistent hedonist, Bentham, in developing his arithmetic of pleasure and pain, introduces the element of value as the significant factor of the hedonist calculus. Thus he does not, like the Cyrenaic, consider the intensity of the pleasure merely as felt; nor, like Epicurus, regard the duration of the feeling simply as continuing and persistent. But Bentham looks upon intensity and duration, as well as the other attributes of feeling, as making up the value of a feeling, so that, in his Hedonism, the end to be sought was not pleasure or quantity of pleasure but value as incorporated in these. Not only does Bentham continually employ value as a term, but his ethical system continually involves the idea. Unfortunately, the method of interpreting value is not purely valuational, but is rather a mixture of mathematics and traditional psychology.

Rigorism, not Hedonism, was the method according to which Kant made his determination of value; more successfully than Bentham, he expressed the inner nature of the principle. "Talent has a market price; temperament, a fancy-price; character, an inner value." In addition to making this serviceable distinction, Kant likewise showed how judgments of value may be made, independently of other forms of judgment. Such judgments were looked upon as being quite distinct from those of taste and were regarded as determined by reverence for ethical ideals. But, just here, Kant failed to advance beyond the rigorism of the Practical Reason. Having adjusted ethical relations in a scholastic manner, Kant then sought to deduce the valuational principle, but this could only be warped by the

ethical system which sought to determine it. While he certainly advanced beyond Bentham, Kant, in distinction from the latter, cut aloof from any possible psychology of value; he did not see that, to exist, value must be felt and thus his imperfect conception of the principle is but the counterpart of Bentham's. Hedonism as well as Intuitionism may have some affinity for the valuational principle, but neither of them fully expresses its import.

To have any kind of completeness, a valuational theory should be regarded from the standpoint of psychology, of ethics and of metaphysics. Hereby may be determined the nature and character of the concept as well as its ultimate validity. Facts of value are facts of consciousness; by virtue of the independence of the affectional process, these may be expressed in value-judgments. Ethically viewed, value is a principle calculated to interpret moral law as well as likely to influence conduct; while, from the standpoint of ultimate reality, it remains to be shown how a world of values is thinkable.

1. Facts of value, as well as those of pleasure, pain, desire and the like, are included in the psychology of affection. As desire is to be distinguished from pleasure, so is value to be differentiated from desire. Mill's attempt to identify the experiences of "desiring a thing and finding it pleasant" may be regarded as a lost cause and just as futile may be considered the endeavor to regard value as the equivalent of desire. At the same time, the independence of the valuational process may be maintained, even when the relation of the latter to desire is acknowledged. For the experience of desiring, value has a most certain affinity; the two, however, are distinct. What then is the essential difference between them? Such a general question may partially be answered by another and particular one. Do we desire things because they have value? or, do things have value because we desire them? By asking such a question, Ehrenfels, in the answer to it, has introduced his own theory of value. "Nicht deswegen begehren wir die Dinge, weil wir jene mystische unfassbare 'Wert' in ihnen erkennen, sondern deswegen sprechen wir den Dingen 'Wert' zu, weil wir sie

begehren.”\* Meinong, whose value-theory is by no means alien to that of Ehrenfels, takes the opposite point of view, urging that, since desire can relate only to what is not present, value must be looked upon as prior and more fundamental. The futurity which is ever essential to desire seems to make it secondary to the valuational principle. Meinong, accordingly, connects value more closely with feeling, so that a thing whose existence gives pleasure has value, while one which involves pain the contrary.† Now, in the case of either theory, the value-idea is at the mercy of purely hedonist considerations.

The relation of pleasure and desire to value is not organic but symptomatic. As a feeling, value is by no means commensurate with the amount of pleasure or the intensity of desire. Masked as it often is by feelings and impulses incident upon certain features of the object in view, value manifests itself as the most fundamental element in the out-going tendencies of the soul. When a course of action has been decided upon and an object is sought, pleasure may be imagined just as desire may be involved; but that which constitutes the essential motive of the act and which gives character to the conduct is a sense of the object's value. Pleasure, in itself, has reference to the present; desire, to the future: value is hampered by no such temporal limits and is thus an unbroken current passing through the act, making conduct what it is. Whereas the enjoyment of pleasure and the satisfaction of desire may be associated with the valuational principle, the cardinal idea does not consist in either of these, but rather is a feeling that some positive gain is to ensue. Everyday experience reveals the fact that that which inspires desire is not the pleasure which the object pursued may bring but some feeling of the object's worth to the soul.

When value fails to be realized, the disappointment which results reveals the peculiar nature of the sentiment. How may this absence of value be expressed? Pleasure fails of enjoyment, but such a fact is, in the calculation, only an imaginary quantity, (V-I), just as unsatisfied desire is a purely negative

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\*“System der Werththeorie,” I. S. 2.

†“Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie,” S. 14-24.

effect. Now, the significant thing involved in the process is to be explained only in terms of value. It is felt that something is lost; an opportunity is gone. And this loss does not consist in pleasure, nor is it expressible as unsatisfied desire, but is rather a loss of value. He who allows to escape unimproved an opportunity to realize something, is stung by the thought that value has been lost. The resulting regret is quite independent of pleasure and desire but is closely connected with the valuational principle.

Value is essentially volitional. Difficult as it is for introspective analysis to identify any conative quality in consciousness, enough is known about the will to make possible its connection with the value-idea. The independence of valuation over against both pleasure and desire is justified by the independence of the volitional quality, even though such be an indeterminate. Volition is distinct from desire as the arbitrariness of human nature well attests; at the same time pathological cases in volition show how the will may act in opposition to desire. Experience reveals a more or less complete bifurcation of affection and conation. Now, the normal determinant of the will would seem to consist in the value-principle. Impulse seeks to realize something; volition issues forth as though somewhat were to be gained. The will, it is true, may in its functioning be closely associated with desire and pleasure; nevertheless, by virtue of value-illusions, volitional activity may become distorted in its arbitrariness. That which thus seems to guide conation is some sense of value.

With its affinity for the two other forms of conscious life, valuation may also be expressed in quasi-intellectual forms. These make up judgments of value. By virtue of the independence of the affectional process are these formed; in them, the essential nature of value is to be found. Such judgments are judgments of feeling. But feeling, in consciousness, is more than felt; it is appreciated and such an appreciation is made possible by means of a judgment. The validity of these judgments may better be urged when there is presented the analogy of æsthetic rather than of logical judgments. Just as facts of value are facts of consciousness, so, judgments of

value are to be included within the precinct of reason. Such judgments are formed in every-day experience; wisdom literature everywhere expresses them; common morality idealizes them. According to such judgments, conduct is guided. Here is involved the transition from the psychology to the ethics of valuation.

2. The character of value may be expressed by saying, "the valuable is the desirable." But what is meant by "the desirable"? Ehrenfels, in order to overcome the difficulty involved in the futurity of reference in desire, has, in his definition of valuation, used almost the same language. "Der Wert eines inges ist seine Begehrbarkeit."\* But this simply means that an object would be desired were it not present in consciousness; as a result, the principles of Hedonism are not transcended. In order to invest value with an ethical character, the idea of the "desirable" must be otherwise interpreted. For value to be realized, desire must be idealized; that which actually is desired is by no means the same as that which should be desired. Not at all commensurate are the desirable and the desired; experience often reveals the fact that the thing desired is not at all desirable. One springs from impulse; the other from judgment. In order to determine the character of value, the Hedonist principle of desire must pass through the alembic of what should be. An exquisite portion of the Hebrew Psalms has made the nature of value distinguishable from both desire and pleasure and, at the same time, has made it as intrinsic as the principles of Intuitionism. "The judgments of Jahveh are true and righteous altogether (Intuitionism.) More to be desired are they than gold (valuational idea). Sweeter also than honey and the honey-comb (Hedonism)." That which is "to be desired" is not deducible from desire as a fact of experience but must be determined by valuational principles.

Vanity is an idea the very opposite of value; by comparing the two, the character of the latter may thus be set in positive relief. As a principle, vanity reveals itself as the natural result of non-ethical conduct; again, it serves to express the apparent inability of moral conduct to bear fruit. Non-ethical

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\**op. cit.*, S. 53.

conduct is to be looked upon, not only as wrong or as involving injustice, but as vain or valueless. Ethical conduct, on the other hand, may seem, in spite of its good and just character, to be of no essential value but rather may appear as in vain. This two-fold conception—of things of vanity and things in vain—serves, by antithesis, to bring out the peculiar nature of the valuational principle. Moral consciousness looks upon immoral conduct as vanity; at the same time, it may be tempted to doubt the positive value of good conduct. So far as non-ethical action is concerned, whatever may result from it may only be looked upon as altogether vanity. Though pleasure be produced in consciousness, though the individual's desire be satisfied, it does not follow that value is realized. Rather by such a state of things is the vanity of the principle seen. On the other hand, to conclude that, after all, good conduct may be in vain, as is sometimes the tendency with the reformer and the religious believer, reveals an attitude of mind in which the logical tendency of ethical relations is involved. For, it is thus seen that the natural expectation concerning moral conduct is that it should produce results and quite natural is the disappointment at its seeming resultlessness. Such a condition of mind may be seen when again the Hebrew Psalms are referred to, this time the seventy-third. The soul which here was undergoing a serious storm and stress was tempted to say, "surely I have cleansed my heart in vain and washed my hands in innocency." Such was the Psalmist's temptation. However he may have overcome it, the sharp contrast of value and vanity cannot fail to be seen nor the valuational character of ethical relations fail to be appreciated.

If desire, in its ideal form, serves to express the inner character of value, destiny, as a secondary principle, likewise enters in to determine the idea. That which modern ethical thought lacks may now be supplied; a goal. Not pleasure, nor yet the satisfaction of conscience makes up the essential nature of ethical relations, but some end conceived of as of value. By virtue of such an interpretation, Rigorism is tempered and Hedonism transfigured. For the true aim of life is not to gratify desire or to perform duty but to realize destiny. That

has value. At the same time, through the valuational determination, both Rigorism and Hedonism are in some sense justified. The desirability of an object as well as the imperative demand of its pursuit are justifiable by that object's value. Value may further be determined by bringing in the idea of result. That which is resultful has value; vain is that which is resultless. But such result cannot be summed up in terms of pleasure or identified with happiness; it must be expressed in terms of value. Such a determination of the valuational principle assumes a theological form and hereby is made possible the transition from the ethical to the metaphysical view of the concept.

3. The essential nature of value is seen when a metaphysical determination is attempted; at the same time, the superiority of the valuational view over Intuitionism and Hedonism is again observed. Both the subject and the object of valuation may be regarded as ultimate and essential. The subject of valuation is none other than the personal ego viewed in its totality and unity. Intuitionism, in its ultimate reference to the ethical subject, fails in the point of unity just as Hedonism is guilty of incompleteness. The one exalts a faculty, the other a process. But the development of the ethical has ever been signalized by new views of the soul: such was the case in ancient and modern as well as in Christian ethics. In ancient thought, the Socratic dictum, *γινῶθι σεαυτόν*, is only a parallel to the modern *jus humanum* of Grotius. Here and there, the foundations of ethical science were laid in a theory of the soul. By separating the soul from the world, Christianity, in the words of its Founder: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" has made possible the union of valuation and its metaphysical basis. Such a union is inevitable. According to Intuitionism, moral facts and relations are indicated; according to Hedonism, they are felt; but, by the valuational view, they are constituted and rendered valid. This is possible by the connection of the principle with the idea of the soul, which determines the principle. Some notion of an ethical realm is the indispensable counterpart of the valuation subject. Here, again the history of ethics in its various stages

affords many an example of such a notion. The world of ideas of Plato, the moral world-order of Fichte and the New Testament Kingdom of God are brilliant examples of the moral realm. Thus is determined a world of value, as the basis of the subject of value. In this valuational cosmos, value is not abstractly represented but actively conserved, so that the determination of such a realm is to be shown not so much by speculation as rather by evincing the fact that ethical consciousness of the individual soul ever postulates such a conservation of value. Such valuational faith relates the subject and object.

The conservation of value shows that ethical relations are something more than norms or ideals; they rather are to be conceived of as constructive and real. Religion thus regards the Kingdom of God as seed sown in the earth, just as moral conduct is looked upon after the analogy of sowing and reaping. Ethical performance should be looked upon as producing results or as bearing fruit. It is true that doubt may often be entertained as to the success of moral conduct so that the subject is tempted to say, What boots it then to do well? but the full consciousness of moral relations involves the idea of conservation. Then it is seen that no moral endeavor is lost, no real gain made by wrong-doing. For the more complete determination of such conservation, Religion becomes necessary. Nevertheless, the essential of this conservation is ethical and, being such, would seem best to be represented as a conservation of value.

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